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The Problem of Property Reprivatization in 
Warsaw 
KATARZYNA J. MCNAUGHTON0F∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly three decades have passed since the collapse of the Iron Cur-
tain, and during this period most post-Soviet European countries have 
gone through a successful process of political, economic, and legal trans-
formation from totalitarian regimes to full democracies. Poland is among 
these countries.  As a result of this transition, Poland became a member 
of NATO in 1999, and, in 2004, joined the political structures of the Eu-
ropean Union. These new allegiances clearly indicate that Poland went 
through a satisfactory process of economic and legal transition and ful-
filled all the necessary membership criteria. Considering the many con-
sequences of this political transformation,1F1 the problem of a lack of adop 
 
∗I would like to thank Professor Michael Bazyler from Chapman University for his encouragement 
to write this paper. His guidance and critical feedback were incredibly helpful. I also owe gratitude 
to Professor Ronald Steiner, also from Chapman University, for his support during my last semester 
of the LLM Programme. 
 1. The Soviet legacy is perceived as one with prevalent corruption at the individual and in-
stitutional level, which lacks decommunization, respect for the rule of law, trust towards legal in-
stitutions and courts, etc. As a result of the Roundtable Agreements in 1989, a political compromise 
between the Communist Party and Solidarity Party was achieved. According to this agreement, the 
Communists were to keep 65 percent of the seats in the Parliament. Thus, the first elected President, 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, was essentially their candidate. In addition, they were guaranteed there would 
be no decommunization and lustration. To many members of the Solidarity movement, this agree-
ment was a “national betrayal,” and resulted in a huge split within the movement. The first non-
Communist Prime Minister in Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, stated in 1989 during his exposé that 
the peaceful transition to democracy should be a priority. Therefore, he introduced the policy of a 
“Thick Line,” meaning formal approval for a policy of non-pursuit of decommunization. The 
Roundtable Agreements allowed for the process of “morphing” of many former communists and 
their collaborators, who remained in positions of power under different titles in the political, legal, 
financial, and academic fields.  This process merely transformed them from corrupt apparatchiks 
to white-collar criminals and corrupt bureaucrats.  See Zbigniew Romaszewski, Nie godzę sie na 
niesprawiedliwość, DZIENNIK POLSKI (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.romaszewski.pl/pub-
likacje/2006_wrzesien-rozmowa-o-okraglym-stole-jego-konsekwencjach-i-nie-tylko-dziennik-
polski-22-wrzesnia-2006-roku; ALEKSANDER KUPATADZE, ORGANIZED CRIME, POLITICAL 
TRANSITIONS AND STATE FORMATION IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA (2006). 
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tion of comprehensive reprivatization laws2F2 may appear to be a minor 
issue. One could not be more mistaken. In Poland, the issue of reprivati-
zation still divides society and results in major social costs, not to mention 
placing a burden on the budget. Most importantly, however, the most re-
cent information coming from various sources (e.g., law enforcement, 
and NGOs) with regard to alleged criminal offenses committed in the 
process of reprivatization of Warsaw’s properties in the past few years 
are alarming and raise very important questions. Among these questions 
are the following: are these crime allegations true, and if so, what is the 
scale of this criminal misconduct, and what percentage of Warsaw’s 
properties have been reprivatized in a fraudulent manner? 
Moreover, for a long time the international community has been crit-
ical of Poland for its reluctance to introduce comprehensive legislation 
that would allow reprivatization of properties nationalized by the Com-
munist government.  In fact, many other post-Soviet European countries, 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, unified Germany, and Estonia, are 
 
 2. See TOMASZ LUTEREK & INSTYTUT STUDIOW POLITYCZNYCH, REPRYWATYZACJA. 
ZRODLA PROBLEMU 324 (2016). Reprivatization is defined as a legal process which aims to return 
the ownership of nationalized property to the previous or original owner. Property becomes nation-
alized when, on the basis of a legal statute, private ownership of a particular property is transferred 
ex lege to the government. The first country to introduce nationalization of private property in order 
to support the implementation of socialist ideology was Russia in 1917. Theoretically, we distin-
guish two forms of nationalization: socialist and capitalist nationalization. The former does not 
foresee any compensation, while the latter, except in criminal cases, typically does. Thus, nation-
alization without granting any compensation to the owner can be equated with confiscation. In legal 
language, the term confiscation comes from the Latin phrase confiscation and confiscate, which 
identifies items and/or property which are taken away from the owner by the government. In the 
Polish Penal Code, the court may order confiscation of property and/or fruits of the crime as an 
additional penalty to the defendant, especially in financial/economic crime cases. Thus, confisca-
tion of property in Polish criminal law should be differentiated from a civil law construction of ius 
caducum, which was incorporated from Roman law. Ius caducum regulates the case of an heirless 
property where ownership is transferred to the government. There are two basic forms of reprivat-
ization: statutory and judicial reprivatization. In the case of statutory reprivatization, the govern-
ment has to enact a legal statute which aims to reverse the process of the prior nationalization of 
private property. If such physical restitution of the ownership of property is not possible, the statute 
establishes financial compensation. Judicial reprivatization is more complex, and it requires an in-
dividual to pursue a claim in civil court challenging the validity of the nationalization decision, 
which allegedly violated substantive laws. The latter is the type of reprivatization that can be iden-
tified in Poland. With three exceptions, the Polish government had never issued any reprivatization 
statute. The first exception applied to the Polish Catholic Church and was issued in 1989. The 
second statute introduced a compensation scheme to those Polish citizens who, between 1944 and 
1952, were forced to relocate from the Eastern part of the Polish territory, which as a result of the 
Yalta Agreement became a jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. The third category includes owners 
who received compensation from the Communist government and who were foreign citizens resid-
ing in Poland at the time of nationalization. From 1948 to 1971, the Polish government signed 
bilateral treaties with various countries whose citizens lost their property as a consequence of the 
process of nationalization. 
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considered model jurisdictions which enacted successful reprivatization 
regimes. 
It appears that Poland paid a “high price” for its move from a total-
itarian regime to a full democracy. The term “high price,” however, can-
not be understood in a strictly economic sense (e.g. budget deficit, infla-
tion, high unemployment, etc.) as it provides us with an over-simplistic 
picture of a post-Soviet European country which has undergone a major 
socio-legal transformation. From 1945 until 1989, the ruling Communist 
government enacted a broad spectrum of nationalization laws which es-
sentially confiscated private property3F3 and created a new landscape of 
ownership relationships. None of the nationalization statutes were explic-
itly repealed either by the democratic government, or by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal.4F4  In contrast to most other post-Soviet countries, the pri-
vate property which was nationalized cannot be returned to the previous 
owners or their heirs, because they do not have legal claims to restitution 
or compensation. Although the framers of the Communist nationalization 
laws (the Bierut Decree) envisioned subsequent compensation statutes,5F5 
these were never enacted, and the Polish Supreme Court6F6 stated that there 
is no cause of action stemming from the lack of subsequent legislative 
action. Additionally, the lack of comprehensive reprivatization legisla-
tion resulted in the emergence of judicial reprivatization, which can be 
explained as individual claims made by former property owners, and/or 
their heirs, challenging nationalization decisions made as a result of erro-
neous application of substantive laws by the Communist government. In 
other words, former owners can only institute a judicial proceeding in the 
Polish courts if it challenges the validity of a particular nationalization 
decision when the communist government itself violated the nationaliza-
tion laws which they established. Thus, by its very nature, a judicial rep-
rivatization is available only to those former owners who lost property 
 
 3. In Poland, prior to World War II, private ownership was the predominant form of owner-
ship; however, between 1944 and 1958, the Communist government passed a bundle of nationali-
zations laws which essentially eliminated capitalism. The following laws were enacted: the Agrar-
ian Reform Decree of 1944, the Nationalization of Forests Decree of 1944, the Warsaw Land 
Decree of 1945, and the Nationalization of Industry Act of 1946. See LUTEREK & INSTYTUT 
STUDIOW POLITYCZNYCH, supra note 2, at 324. 
 4. The Constitutional Tribunal is the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court, as it determines 
the constitutionality of Polish legislation. In a 2001 verdict, the Court stated that, after the passage 
of many decades after the nationalization of land in the country, some profound social, economic, 
and legal effects had occurred which are long-term and non-reversible. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny 
[Constitutional Tribunal], SK 5/01, Nov. 28, 2001 (Pol.). 
 5. The only exception is the 1944 Agrarian Reform Decree. 
 6. See Sąd Naczelny [Supreme Court], CZP 82/05, Nov. 24, 2005 (Pol.). 
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because the Communist government disregarded the laws which they en-
acted, and is not available to those whose property was nationalized in 
accordance with the (Communist) law at that time, albeit without any 
compensation. The fact that the Polish government has never issued any 
compensation legislation for the nationalized property does not constitute 
a governmental tort,7F7 and thus, attempts of Polish claimants to receive 
compensation through the European Tribunal of Human Rights have not 
been successful.8F8   
The very fact that legal status, in terms of eligibility to initiate judi-
cial reprivatization, varies significantly among individuals, creates ten-
sions within society. Successful claimants are perceived to be unfairly 
privileged. For an average citizen, the entire concept of judicial reprivat-
ization is vague and not easily comprehensible, as it requires a deep 
knowledge of various areas of law, such as administrative, constitutional 
and civil law.  Moreover, Poland, like other post-Soviet European coun-
tries after the collapse of the Communist regime, went through an intense 
social stratification and marginalization of major segments of society, as 
well as negative economic changes for which Polish society was not pre-
pared. The new system was not perceived as more fair and just, and to 
some members of society, the feeling of deprivation became a prominent 
feature of their lives. While in the past it was the totalitarian system, today 
it is the ‘invisible hand of the market’ that has resulted in the general 
feeling of anomie.9F9 Thus, from a societal perspective, it is understandable 
that the current model of judicial reprivatization can be perceived as un-
just, and that its complex legal mechanism, as exhibited in the case of 
Warsaw, can be labelled as “wild.”10F10   
 
 7. The Supreme Court in its decision from 2005 stated that the lack of enactment of compen-
sation laws, despite the fact that nationalization statutes explicitly obliged the government to issue 
them, doesn’t qualify as a governmental tort. The main reason behind this finding was that at the 
time when nationalization statutes were passed, the Polish Constitution and Civil Code did not 
contain any provisions introducing this type of tort. In 2004, a major reform of the Polish Civil 
Code finally established a concept of governmental tort, but these new provisions do not apply to 
events which took place prior to this reform, in accordance with the principle of Lex Retro Non 
Agit. See id. at 4. 
 8. See for example, Ogorek v. Poland, ECHR, Application No. 28490/03, Decision of 18 
September 2012; Pikielny and Others v. Poland, ECHR, Application No. 3524/05, Decision of 18 
September 2012; Sierminski v. Poland, ECHR, Application No. 53339/09, Judgment of 2 Decem-
ber 2014. 
 9. Robert Merton, On the Evolving Synthesis of Differential Association and Anomie Theory: 
A Perspective from the Sociology of Science, in SOCIAL DEVIANCE, READINGS IN THEORY AND 
RESEARCH (2001). 
 10. “Wild reprivatization” is not a legal term, but rather a figure of speech introduced in public 
media and by Warsaw’s NGOs, like Miasto Jest Nasze, for example. See Jakub Oworuszko & Piotr 
Wroblewski, Warsaw: There is a map of Wild Reprivatization. 28 Investigations Resumed, the case 
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This article examines the problem of reprivatization in Poland, with 
particular emphasis on the legal issues of judicial reprivatization in War-
saw, as well as its consequences for the justice system and society. It is 
important to emphasize that Polish society was harmed twice by the ap-
plication of punitive laws which confiscated and nationalized their pri-
vate property without compensation: first by the German Nazi occupiers, 
and subsequently by the Communists. This fact certainly adds to society’s 
perception of the scale of injustice and suffering that they went through 
from 1939 until 1989. However, there were segments of Polish society 
for whom the process of nationalization was quite beneficial, for exam-
ple, the land reform introduced in 1944, which granted ownership of farm 
lands to many Polish peasants. 
Part II of the paper opens with subsection A, which starts with a 
general overview of the problem of sovereignty of the Communist gov-
ernment, and the legality of nationalization laws. With the lack of com-
prehensive reprivatization law in the country, these arguments are often 
raised as legal arguments of last resort in front of the Polish courts by the 
claimants. This part of the paper will explain the lack of efficacy behind 
these arguments, as well as the fact that Polish individuals have no legal 
claims of restitution or compensation under the current laws. This state 
of affairs is caused by the lack of adequate laws and by the adoption of 
the principle of legal continuity between the communist state and the 
democratic state, as established in 1989. 
In subsections B and C, we will examine the problem of judicial 
reprivatization, as it has emerged in Warsaw in the past few years.  This 
part will analyze the root causes and patterns of the manifestation of the 
problem, and finally will scrutinize the phenomenon of “wild reprivati-
zation.” We will evaluate its nature and scale.  Finally, we will consider 
the implications of this problem.  In the light of various irregularities dis-
closed in the process of judicial reprivatization in Warsaw, the Polish 
Parliament enacted a new statute in 2016 which aims to remedy the prob-
lem. In the final subsection of this part of the paper, we will evaluate the 
pros and cons of this legislation. The final part of this paper ends with 
general remarks regarding the problem of restitution in Poland, and points 
to potential ways to address it, so that a satisfactory form of social justice 
may be achieved. 
 
of Jolanta Brzeska Returns, POLSKA (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.polskatimes.pl/fakty/poli-
tyka/a/warszawa-jest-mapa-dzikiej-reprywatyzacji-28-sledztw-wznowionych-wraca-sprawa-
jolanty-brzeskiej,10732406/; Warszawka Mapa Reprywatyzacji, MIASTO JEST NASZE, http://repry-
watyzacja.miastojestnasze.org/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
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II.  THE PROBLEM OF REPRIVATIZATION IN POLAND 
A. The General Overview of the Current Legal Framework 
In November 2016, the Warsaw Bar Association11F11 organized a con-
ference devoted to the problem of reprivatization in Warsaw, during 
which lawyers and academics had an opportunity to discuss this complex 
issue from an interdisciplinary perspective. Zbigniew Banaszczyk12F12 was 
one of the main speakers, and, in his opening remarks, he got to the core 
of the issue of reprivatization in Poland. He emphasized that if one were 
to take a narrow legal perspective, the issue of reprivatization would not 
exist in Poland per se.  In the public discourse, the term reprivatization 
had been used erroneously because none of the nationalization laws 
which were enacted in Poland, including the Bierut Decree, ever intro-
duced any compensatory regime for the former owners.  In other words, 
under the current Polish legislation, there are no legal claims which for-
mer owners may pursue to achieve restitution of the original property or 
financial compensation. Therefore, the problem of reprivatization in Po-
land, from the legal perspective, is in fact a problem of vindication by 
various individuals of their constitutional right to be compensated for 
damages which occurred as a result of a governmental tort.13F13 Moreover, 
the process of revindication of a constitutional right, in connection with 
the government’s liability for damages inflicted in the exercise of public 
authority, is possible only because of the recognition in the domestic legal 
system of the principle of legal continuity of the laws adopted by the 
Communist government. The doctrine of legal continuity is well known 
in jurisdictions which went through a process of political transformation 
 
 11. In light of the most recent cases of allegedly fraudulent reprivatization taking place in 
Warsaw, as revealed by the Polish press and the association of Warsaw’s citizens called Miasto 
Jest Nasze, this conference constituted a very important reaction of Warsaw’s district lawyers spe-
cializing in reprivatization claims under the Bierut Decree. In addition to lawyers and academics, 
representatives of various non-governmental organizations, including the World Jewish Organiza-
tion, were also present. See Konferencja “Reprywatyzacja. Rzeczywistość - Mity – Przyszłość”, 
OKRĘGOWA RADA ADWOKACKA W WARSZAWIE (Oct.24,2016), http://www.ora-war-
szawa.com.pl/pl/7431266-konferencja-reprywatyzacja-rzeczywistosc-mity-przyszlosc. 
 12. Zbigniew Banaszczyk is a lawyer and a professor at the Civil Law Department at the Uni-
versity of Warsaw. He is a recognized expert in the area of governmental tort liability, and author 
of many publications in his area of interest. See Zbigniew Banaszczyk, BIBLIOGRAFIA 
UNIWERSYTETU WARSZAWSKIEGO, http://bibliografia.icm.edu.pl/g2/main.pl?mod=s&a= 
1&s=4627&imie=Zbigniew&nazwisko=Banaszczyk (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 13. In the civil law systems, like Poland’s, a different legal term is being used in this context, 
namely a “delict.” Delict was incorporated from the Roman law tradition to conceptualize an obli-
gation to compensate another party for wrongdoing, absent a contractual relationship between par-
ties.   
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from a totalitarian regime to a full democracy. According to this princi-
ple, despite the political change, the new democratic country is founded 
upon the existing legal framework. In other words, the laws which were 
adopted by the Communist regime remain valid and stay in force until 
they are explicitly revoked by the Constitutional Tribunal or by a legisla-
tive act of the Polish Parliament. Thus, the process of legal transition 
means that an entirely new legal system is built upon the foundation of 
the old Communist regime. Reliance on the principle of legal continuity 
is not intended to provide the totalitarian law with any legal legitimacy; 
it simply prevents the country from going into a state of legal chaos. De-
spite any political transformation, including a totalitarian regime, no 
country can start from a point of “zero” when it comes to its laws.14F14  In 
the context of a legal transformation, another legal principle which plays 
a substantial role in the process of reprivatization in Poland is non-retro-
spectivity of laws. It provides a foundation for other principles: legal se-
curity, certainty of legal transactions, and protection of established rights. 
It seems that one of the important features of the process of repri-
vatization in Poland, and in particular in Warsaw, is its legal complexity, 
i.e., the interaction of various provisions of civil, administrative, and con-
stitutional law. As already mentioned, the term reprivatization that circu-
lates in the public discourse is misleading in the sense that it creates an 
impression that former owners possess legal claims under the nationali-
zation statutes, which they do not.15F15 Taking a legal perspective to this 
issue clearly reveals that a thorough understanding of the nature and effi-
cacy of revindicative claims by former owners requires an examination 
of the Polish civil law regime for the government’s liability for damages 
inflicted in the exercise of public authority. That is because when the na-
tionalization laws were established, including the 1945 Bierut Decree,16F16 
former owners, pursuant to these statutes, lost their ownership of various 
types of properties ex lege.  The only reason why the former owners could 
sometimes recover their property or receive compensation is because 
 
 14. A strong doctrine of legal continuity can be identified in the rulings of constitutional courts 
of other post-Soviet Eastern European countries, i.e., the Czech Republic and Slovakia. For a com-
parative study, see WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
(2005). 
 15. Acknowledgement of this fact remains difficult to accept for many Polish victims of na-
tionalization laws. Thus, due to a lack of domestic legal provisions, victims often decided to pursue 
their claims at the European Tribunal of Human Rights. 
 16. Decree on Ownership and Usufruct of Land in the Area in the Capital of Warsaw, Oct. 
26, 1945, art. 7 ust. 1 [hereinafter Bierut Decree]. 
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these nationalization laws often were enforced by the government in vi-
olation of their substantive provisions. In other words, the Communist 
government was legally entitled to nationalize property within various 
sectors of the economy, but only under particular conditions set forth in 
these statutes. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the Bierut Decree was introduced 
in order to rebuild the capital of Poland, which was substantially de-
stroyed during the war. Under this decree, the ownership of all land prop-
erties located within the Warsaw city borders was transferred to the mu-
nicipality of the Capital City of Warsaw. However, the former owners 
had the right to apply for temporary ownership of the property,17F17 which 
the decree described as a right of perpetual usufruct, under the condition 
that the enjoyment of this right by the owners could be reconciled with 
the local plan of urban development. As the evidence indicates, a majority 
of these official claims were rejected by the government, despite the fact 
that the usage of the property could have been easily reconciled with the 
local plan. Thus, these refusals were discretionary, arbitrary, and issued 
in violation of the Decree itself. The bottom line is that if the Communist 
government had enforced the Bierut Decree and other nationalization 
laws without any violation, there would be no basis for reprivatization or 
revindication of the former owner’s rights. Thus, the legal essence of the 
Polish reprivatization mechanism lies within the Polish Code of Admin-
istrative Procedure. The major issue of whether the Communist govern-
ment committed wrongdoing, delict, or a tort while conducting national-
ization rests within the judicial discretion of specialized administrative 
courts, not civil courts.18F18 
 
 17. This term was developed by the Polish jurisprudence in order to emphasize that it is prac-
tically a legal ownership, although limited in time, and with an obligation to pay a lease. As we see, 
the term reprivatization which circulates in the public discourse is misleading in the sense that it 
creates an impression that former owners possess legal claims under the nationalization statutes, 
which they do not. 
 18. Specialized courts, such as administrative courts and labour courts, are a unique feature 
of the Polish judicial system. They handle litigation in very specific, but narrow areas of the law.  
With regard to the problem of a lack of comprehensive legislation on the issue of reprivatization in 
Poland, these courts were forced to carry on their shoulders the heavy burden of deciding issues 
which, in a democratic country, should be decided by the legislature and society. I have received 
this critical opinion from a civil law expert at the University of Warsaw, Professor Maciej Kalinski, 
whom I had the pleasure of interviewing for the purpose of this paper during my research trip stay 
in Warsaw in November of 2016.  His opinions stand in striking opposition to the view presented 
by another Polish scholar, and a former Constitutional Tribunal Justice, Professor Ewa Letowska. 
She criticizes the very concept that administrative courts decide the issue of governmental tort while 
being completely removed from the mainstream of legal thought, as expressed by the Polish Civil 
Supreme Court, and Constitutional Tribunal. In her opinion, for various reasons, judges from ad-
ministrative courts do not see or understand that by deciding individual cases of reprivatization, 
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B. The Emergence of a New Paradigm of Judicial Reprivatization in 
Warsaw 
In Poland, the process of nationalization was pursued as a major 
economic reform, enacted by the Communist government from 1944 un-
til 1952.19F19 Reprivatization is a legal and economic process subsequent to 
nationalization, and can have a statutory or judicial form.20F20  In the case 
of statutory reprivatization, a statute is enacted by the parliament in order 
to reverse the process of nationalization by either returning the ownership 
of a property to a legal owner (restitutio in natura), or, if such restitution 
is not possible, in the form of financial compensation (restitutio in val-
uta). In Poland, as already mentioned, the scale of nationalization was 
massive; however, statutory reprivatization was never introduced, despite 
the fact that nationalization acts themselves envisioned enactment of sub-
sequent compensatory provisions.21F21 Thus, the current problem of repri-
vatization in Poland refers to a judicial revision of legality of nationali-
zation acts. If the court determines that a particular nationalization was 
carried out in violation of then binding statutes, it can decide either to 
restore the ownership of the property to its legal owner,22F22 or to compen-
sate for damages.   
The issue of judicial reprivatization constitutes a complex bundle of 
administrative and civil laws with legal loopholes and ambiguities. Be-
cause of the lack of comprehensive reprivatization laws, administrative 
and civil courts were forced to deal with reprivatization claims, and thus 
 
they essentially shape the socio-legal landscape of the country without taking any responsibility for 
the social consequences of their recognition of illegality of nationalization decisions.   
 19. The primary goal of nationalization laws was to eradicate any form of private ownership, 
as a necessary precondition to implement a political system based on a Marxist/Leninist version of 
socialist ideology. Robert Jastrzebski, Reprywatyzacja w Panstwie Polskim z Punktu Widzenia His-
torii Prawa, in STUDIA I ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO TOM III 22 (Mateusz Pilich ed., 2016). 
 20. Reprivatization is a term commonly used in public discourse, however, it has never been 
introduced by any statutory law, or a case-law, and thus, there is no legal definition of this term in 
Polish law.   
 21. With the exception of two statutes, which regulated reprivatization with regard to the 
Polish Catholic Church, and so called “Mienie Zabuzanskie.”  As a result of nationalization of land 
and forests, approximately 2700.000 ha. of land, and 1780.000 ha. of forests were taken over from 
private hands into the government’s hands. See PIOTR MAKARZEC, SPRAWOZDANIE Z II 
KONGRESU OGÓLNOPOLSKIEGO POROZUMIENIA ORGANIZACJI REWINDYKACYJNYCH, 
WARSZAWA, 19 MARCA 2007 (2007). 
 22. This form of restitution is not possible if a third party, acting in good faith, purchased such 
a property from the government. 
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became the policy makers. In particular, judicial reprivatization with re-
gard to Warsaw’s properties23F23 constitutes a very recent socio-legal phe-
nomenon, which illustrates the various negative consequences when a ju-
diciary is forced to fulfill the role of a policy maker. 
Warsaw’s private properties were nationalized under the Bierut De-
cree of 1945,24F24 which introduced a very specific legal mechanism of na-
tionalization, explicitly violating a fundamental principle of the Roman 
law, i.e., superficies solo cedit. The essence of nationalization under the 
Bierut Decree was that the government was taking over ownership of the 
land, while the former owner, under particular circumstances, could still 
possess “temporary ownership” of the building. Under this decree, the 
ownership of all land properties located within Warsaw’s city borders 
was transferred ex lege to the municipality of the City of Warsaw, while 
former owners had the right to apply for a perpetual lease25F25 of the land, 
under the condition that the enjoyment by the former owner of this right 
could be reconciled with the officially established purpose of a particular 
property in the Urban Plan of Development of the City of Warsaw. The 
owner had only six months to submit the application from the date that 
the City of Warsaw took possession of a particular property. If the appli-
cant did not submit the claim within this statutorily designated period of 
time, such a claim was considered to expire. Regardless of the original 
intentions of the Communist lawmakers,26F26 a few facts need to be empha-
sized. First, the Decree in Art. 8 provided that a separate compensation 
 
 23. Initial signals concerning suspicious irregularities with regard to reprivatization in War-
saw came from non-governmental organizations such as Miasto Jest Nasze. Also, a significant 
amount of investigative journalism disclosed information indicating potential criminal offences be-
ing committed by Warsaw City Hall officials in the process of reprivatization of various city prop-
erties. 
 24. The Bierut Decree was a statute introduced in 1945 which nationalized a majority of War-
saw’s private properties. While the full name of this statute was a Decree on Ownership and Usu-
fruct of Land in the Area of the Capital City of Warsaw, it became known as Bierut’s Decree, 
named after the First Communist Party official at the time of its introduction, Boleslaw Bierut.  
Approximately 40,000 private properties were taken away from the private owners, which was 
about 94% of the city, from the pre-World War II borders. See Jerry S. Majewski, Warsaw curse 
Bierut, WYBORCZA.PL (Feb. 9, 2015), http://wyborcza.pl/alehistoria/1,121681,17369869,War-
szawskie_przeklenstwo_Bieruta.html?disableRedirects=true. 
 25. Under Art. 7 ust. 1 of the Decree, the original claim of the former owner to obtain perpet-
ual lease was subsequently reformulated into a perpetual usufruct, which in legal doctrine is often 
defined as a temporary ownership because of the time limit of the ownership over the property, i.e., 
up to 99 years. See Bierut Decree, supra note 17, art 1.   
 26. Important feedback in this context was provided by Dr. Tomasz Krawczyk, who is an 
attorney in Warsaw specializing in the area of reprivatization. He emphasized that, considering the 
fact that World War II had just ended, the introduction of a six-month period of time to claim a 
temporary ownership was designed with questionable intentions because the process of publication 
of this decree was not very formal and transparent. 
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statutory regime would be enacted if temporary ownership was not 
granted. Second, the enforcement of the Decree by the Communist gov-
ernment was conducted in bad faith; in a majority of cases, claims for the 
establishment of temporary ownership were rejected. In other words, 
there was no discretionary power for Warsaw city administrative officials 
to decide whether the owner could obtain temporary ownership. Once the 
conditions established in Art. 7 para. 2 were met, the government was 
obliged to grant temporary ownership of the nationalized property. Due 
to the fact that the Decree did not precisely define the meaning of its rel-
evant provisions, the reality was that the government denied almost all 
applications27F27 when a particular property was designed to fulfill any pub-
lic utility function, such as schools, hospitals, living apartments, and ho-
tels. Moreover, it was often the case that claims were rejected even when 
the official plan of development had not yet been adopted for a particular 
property. A detailed examination of this unique legal mechanism of na-
tionalization, as introduced in the Bierut Decree, is necessary in order to 
understand the essence of judicial reprivatization in Warsaw, and the root 
causes of its abuse.28F28 
1. First, the ownership of nationalized properties was automatically 
transferred to the municipality of the Capital City of Warsaw; in other 
 
 27. Art. 7 ust. 2 states that temporary ownership of the property must be granted by the mu-
nicipality of the City of Warsaw if the enjoyment by the present owner could be reconciled with 
the use of the land, as specified in the urban plan of development. According to the official data, 
from approximately 40,000 nationalized properties, roughly 17,000 claims were filed from 1946, 
which means that only 30% of Warsaw’s property owners filed a claim under the Bierut Decree. 
Around 4,000 properties were subject of a restitution to former owners between 2002 and 2016, 
while approximately 3,500 cases are in motion, and about 4,600 cases are still pending, meaning 
that they were filed by the former owners, but the communist government never took them under 
their consideration (so-called “sleeping claims”). Tomasz Demiańczuk, Biała Księga repry-
watyzacji warszawskich nieruchomości, MAISTO STOŁECZNE WARSZAWA (July 13, 2016), 
www.um.warszawa.pl/aktualnosci/bia-ksi-ga-reprywatyzacji-warszawskich-nieruchomo-ci. 
 28. As already stated, it is very difficult to provide an accurate answer of how many reprivat-
ization decisions in Warsaw qualify as criminal offenses involving fraud, corruption, and abuse of 
power. The criminal investigation is ongoing, and in February 2017, in the light of recently dis-
closed reprivatization scandals, the Polish Parliament, on the basis of a newly enacted statute, es-
tablished a special investigative reprivatization commission. This commission was granted a mix-
ture of prosecutorial and administrative powers, with the main goal of reviewing suspicious prior 
reprivatization decisions. The Chair of this Commission is Patryk Jaki, a Vice-Minister of Justice, 
and its members were elected by the parliament. This commission is designed to cooperate with 
the prosecutors if deemed necessary. If the commission determines that a particular case of repri-
vatization in Warsaw creates a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense was committed, a legal 
warning that there is a criminal investigation in progress with regard to a particular property must 
be disclosed in the official land registry documents for the subject property. Informacje, 
MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI (Oct. 18, 2016),  https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/informacje 
/news,8717,komisja-weryfikacyjna-w-sprawie-reprywatyzacji.html; https://ms.gov.pl/pl/o-minis-
terstwie/kierownictwo-ministerstwa-sprawiedliwosci/. 
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words, nationalization took effect ex lege, without any subsequent admin-
istrative or court decisions. 
2. Two types of claims were granted to former owners. The first was 
limited in time, i.e. six months from the moment that the City of Warsaw 
took possession of a particular property, and constituted a claim for the 
establishment of temporary ownership,29F29 which the administrative au-
thorities of Warsaw were obliged to acknowledge if the enjoyment of the 
property by the owner could have been reconciled with the use of land 
specified in the urban plan of development. 
3. The second claim was compensatory in nature,30F30 and was availa-
ble to those former owners who submitted a temporary ownership appli-
cation which was not granted.  The scope and legal mechanism of the 
enforcement of these compensatory claims was to be established in a sep-
arate statute, which was never enacted31F31 
As a result of the enforcement of the Bierut Decree, former owners 
can be grouped into two legal categories: those who lost their property 
and never filed a claim for the establishment of temporary ownership, and 
those whose claims were rejected or never considered by the government.  
Only the latter category of owners can pursue reprivatization claims.32F32 
However, the efficacy of these claims depends on whether the property 
was nationalized prior to 1958, and whether the original nationalization 
act will be nullified by the court or declared as issued in violation of laws.  
In addition, when we link the provisions of the Bierut Decree with the 
subsequent laws (which were enacted during the entire Communist era, 
and whose primary purpose was to expand the original scope of condi-
tions justifying nationalization), it becomes clear that the legal situation 
of former owners must be individually examined. The status of reprivat-
ization claims in Poland is a case-by-case analysis, as the court must de-
termine whether the violation of law by the Communist government was 
substantial, and if a restitutio in natura is possible.   
 
 29. The Bierut Decree, supra note 16, art. 7 ust. 2., refers to a right to perpetual usufruct. 
 30. See id., art. 7 ust. 5. 
 31. The Bierut Decree, in its closing articles, provides explicitly that a separate statute will be 
enacted in order to establish a compensatory legal framework. See Bierut Decree, supra note 16. 
 32. Reprivatization claims are based on Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego [K.p.a] 
[Code of Administrative Procedure] Art. 156 § 1 (Pol.). 
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It seems that the least complex legal situation can be identified in 
the following scenario:  when the former owner filed the claim to obtain 
temporary ownership, which was subsequently denied in violation of law, 
and the act of nationalization caused irreversible legal effects (Scenario 
A). Under these circumstances, the administrative court cannot nullify 
the nationalization act, but can only declare that such an act was issued 
in gross violation of law.33F33  This verdict provides the claimant with a di-
rect compensatory claim, based on Art. 160 of the K.p.a. The most com-
plex cases of reprivatization are those where the former owner filed the 
claim for temporary ownership, which was never decided by the govern-
ment (Scenario B) and also those where a temporary ownership claim 
was denied in violation of law, and subsequently nullified by the admin-
istrative court (Scenario C). 
Fig. 1. Judicial Reprivatization Model under the Bierut Decree: No Le-
gal Basis for Compensation Per Se for the Act of Nationalization  
 
In this case, due to the fact that the Bierut Decree is still in force, a 
new administrative proceeding pursuant to Art. 7.1 will reopen. As al-
ready mentioned, the scope of conditions under which the government 
can nationalize Warsaw’s property was significantly expanded in the sub-
sequent statutes,34F34 and basically, from 1958, the government was granted 
an extensive discretionary power to nationalize any private property.35F35 
 
 33. To be legally precise, the court declares that the administrative decision which denied 
temporary ownership of the property was issued in gross violation of law. 
 34. Especially when in 1958, the Real Estate Management Act and Mechanisms of National-
ization was adopted. Ustawa z dnia 12 marca o Zasadach i Trybie Wywlaszczaniu Nieruchomosci 
[Act of March 12, 1958 on the Rules and Procedure of Expropriation of Real Estate] (1958 Dz. U. 
nr. 17 poz. 70) (Pol.). 
 35. When the Communist government was limited exclusively by the Bierut Decree, it had to 
consider a particular plan of urban development for the city of Warsaw when making a nationali-
zation decision. However, due to the introduction of another nationalization statutory law in 1958, 
the Communist government was no longer limited to consider Warsaw’s urban plan of development 
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On the basis of these statutes, only some categories of owners36F36 are enti-
tled to compensation, in a maximum amount of 10% of the average cost 
of building a five room house.37F37  In particular, as a result of the introduc-
tion in 1958 of the Real Estate Management and Mechanism of Nation-
alization Act, the legal situation of Warsaw’s former property owners38F38 
was deliberately differentiated by the policy maker. The line of legal di-
vision went along an arbitrarily decided date of April 1958, because those 
who lost their property prior to this date were left without any compen-
sation.   
This state of affairs lasted for many decades until 2011, when the 
Constitutional Tribunal39F39 had to address the constitutionality of the pro-
visions of the 1958 statute.40F40 At the core of the Tribunal’s legal analysis 
was Art. 215.2,41F41 and whether it violates the Polish Constitution of 1997 
by ignoring the right to compensation held by those categories of owners 
who lost their property as a result of nationalization acts prior to 1958.  
The verdict of the Tribunal was considered very unsatisfactory because it 
stated that this is a matter which requires legislative action by the Parlia-
ment in the form of a comprehensive reprivatization law. The truth is that 
the Tribunal “washed its hands” by not deciding on this important issue 
because it only delivered a non-binding opinion for civil courts according 
to which Art. 215 is constitutional, but only when applied to the entire 
category of former owners, regardless of the date of nationalization. The 
gravity of this verdict is enormous from the perspective of litigation over 
reprivatization claims in Warsaw because of the following issue: when a 
 
when making nationalization decisions, as the scope of legal conditions justifying nationalization 
was substantially expanded. For example, it could justify its decision by the necessity to fulfill the 
Economic Plan, which were typically established for a five-year period by the Communist Party.   
 36. There were only two categories of owners who were granted a limited compensatory right 
if the nationalization of their property took place after April 4th, 1958: owners of a family house 
and building plot, and owners of farming, fruit, and vegetable farms. 
 37. See  Ustawa z dnia 30 listopada 1995 r. o pomocy państwa w spłacie niektórych kredytów 
mieszkaniowych, refundacji bankom wypłaconych premii gwarancyjnych oraz zmianie niektórych 
ustaw. [Act of 30 Nov. 1995 on State Aid in Repayment of Some Housing Loans, Reimbursement 
of Guarantee Premiums Paid to Banks and Amendments to Certain Acts] (1995 Dz. U. nr 5, poz. 
32) (Pol.). 
 38. Those whose property was originally nationalized under the Bierut Decree. 
 39. The verdict was issued on October 28, 2015, P 6/13. Maciej Górski, TK odebrał nadzieję 
byłym właścicielom gruntów warszawskich na odszkodowanie, RZECZPOSPOLITA (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.rp.pl/Opinie/301259975-TK-odebral-nadzieje-bylym-wlascicielom-gruntow-
warszawskich-na-odszkodowanie.html#ap-1. 
 40. The 1958 Act on Real Estate Management was replaced by the 1985 Act on Land Man-
agement and Expropriation, which after several reforms is still in force in Poland.  1958 Dz. U. nr. 
17 poz. 70; Ustawy o Gospodarce Nieruchmosciami [Act on Land Management and Expropriation] 
(Dz. U. 1985 nr. 22. poz. 99) (Pol.).   
 41. Dz. U. 1985 nr. 22. poz. 99. 
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former property owner succeeds at the administrative court by having the 
nationalization act declared null, the original claim for the establishment 
of temporary ownership will be revisited one more time.42F42 If one of the 
following conditions is met, there will be no restitutio in natura:43F43  
1) the property was sold, or a third party obtained a right of tempo-
rary ownership;44F44 
2) the original property cannot be separated (e.g. a plot was built-up 
after World War II and the new building crosses over the borders of the 
original property. This seems to be a common problem in the Old Town, 
where buildings had been destroyed in World War II and subsequently 
reconstructed, but not within the same borders), or; 
3) the land is used as a public road or is designated a public road. 
Under this scenario, the only available claim for the former owner 
can be found in Art. 160 K.p.a,45F45 under which the former owner can be 
compensated for damages caused by unlawful nationalization, which is 
limited to damnum emergens.  
It is important to emphasize at this point that this is not a nationali-
zation compensation per se, but rather a compensation for damages 
caused by the fact that the government pursued nationalization in viola-
tion of law. Thus, it becomes clear at this point that the term “reprivati-
zation,” which functions in the public discourse, is not the most adequate 
legal term to describe the process of vindication by various individuals of 
their constitutional right to be compensated for damages caused by un-
lawful nationalization decisions.46F46 
 
 42. Keeping in mind that the original scope of conditions justifying refusal of such a claim 
had been significantly expanded under legislation subsequent to the Bierut Decree. 
 43. This legal feedback was kindly provided by attorney Maciej Gorski, who is a Warsaw-
based expert in this area of law. See Prawo nieruchomości - więcej niż pasja, MACIEJ GORSKI, 
http://maciej-gorski.pl (last visited Jan. 31, 2018); Ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. o gospodarce 
nieruchomościami [The Act dated 21 August 1997 on Real Estate Management] art. 215 (1997 Dz. 
U. nr. 115 poz. 741) (Pol.) [hereinafter Act on Land Management and Nationalization]. 
 44. Despite the fact that the civil construction of a right of temporary ownership was clearly 
an invention of the Communist government, this construction survived and still exists in the legal 
sphere. Thus, any property nationalized by the government could have been subsequently sold or 
obtained by a third party’s right of temporary ownership. 
 45. The legal situation of a former owner who filed the original claim for the establishment of 
temporary ownership which was never decided, is similar to the above analyzed scenario. Whether 
the court will consider interpreting the ALMN in broad terms, and thus grant compensation as a 
result of the fact that a final nationalization decision was lawfully issued, is problematic.   
 46. As Professor Banaszczyk stated, judicial reprivatization in Poland exists because the cur-
rent government took the legal responsibility of compensating former owners for the governmental 
torts committed during the Communist era.   
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In the process of judicial reprivatization, one has to differentiate be-
tween a compensation for an unlawful nationalization act,47F47 and a com-
pensation for the nationalization act per se. The latter form of compensa-
tion was never explicitly introduced in the legal system. The only legal 
provision which provides a limited form of compensation for nationalized 
property is Art. 215 of the Act on Land Management and Nationalization 
(ALMN).48F48 However, as already indicated, this provision is very prob-
lematic in terms of its constitutional validity because it applies only to a 
limited category of owners.49F49  
Due to the fact that the Constitutional Tribunal issued a non-binding 
legal opinion regarding the lack of constitutionality of this article, the en-
tire paradigm of judicial reprivatization is without any solid legal foun-
dation.50F50 Litigation attorneys51F51 have attempted to convince civil courts 
that the compensation as dictated by the ALMN act should be applicable 
to all claimants. The only weakness in their legal arguments is that they 
cannot rely on any authority.  
 
 47. This distinction is decided by administrative courts, and if the court finds that nationali-
zation was pursued in gross violation of law, and the act itself caused irreversible legal effects, the 
court cannot nullify such a decision but may only decide that a particular nationalization act was 
issued in violation of law. The latter verdict opens a direct compensatory claim based on Art. 160 
K.p.a. 
 48. This act, originally introduced in 1958, went through several major reforms in 1985 and 
1997. Art. 134 ust. 1 and Art. 151 regulate the procedure and scope of compensation, which is 
evaluated by taking into consideration the condition of the property on the date of nationalization 
and the current market-based value of similar properties. Act on Land Management and Nationali-
zation, supra note 43, Art. 215. 
 49. This provision applies to those owners who lost their property after April 5th, 1958, and 
only if the government nationalized certain categories of land: agricultural land, a one-family 
house, or a plot designed for a one-family house. Obwieszczenie Marszalka Sejmu Rzeczypo-
spolitej Polskiej z jnia 30 listopada 2004 r. w sprawie ogloszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy o gos-
podarce nieruchomosciami [Announcement of the Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland 
regarding the Publication of a Uniform Text of the Act on Real Estate Management] (2004 r. Dz. 
U. nr. 261 poz. 2603) (Pol.). 
 50. This fact is well acknowledged by some representatives of the Polish doctrine. For exam-
ple, Dr. T. Luterek’s opinion seems to be very critical, as he describes this paradigm as a “Koncep-
tualna Przewała Reprywatyzacyjna,” which can be translated into a “Conceptually-Quasi-Fraudu-
lent Reprivatization.” See  Reprywatyzacja “Być może czekają nas roszczenia lokatorów” 
Rozmowa, Sᴜᴘᴇʀ Bɪᴢ.ᴘʟ (May 12, 2016), http://superbiz.se.pl/opinie-biz/reprywatyzacja-byc-
moze-czekaja-nas-roszczenia-lokatorow-wywiad_922354.html. 
 51. This was a very important point made by attorney Tomasz Krawczyk, from the Warsaw 
Law Offices of Golebiowska, Krawczyk & Partners. See Reprywatyzacja, GKR LEGAL, 
https://www.gkrlegal.pl/oferta/159/. (He emphasized that it is not possible to evaluate in an accu-
rate manner the probability of winning in any reprivatization case, as one judge may decide to 
follow the broad interpretation of the ALMN act, as suggested by the Constitutional Tribunal, while 
another judge will simply reject it). 
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The current socio-legal phenomenon of judicial reprivatization in 
Warsaw52F52 cannot be explained without making a reference to the judicial 
system of administrative courts, due to their significant role within the 
process, as well as the impact of classical civil law jurisprudence on these 
courts’ reprivatization decisions.  
 The significant position and jurisdiction of administrative courts in 
the Polish justice system comes from the fact that Polish legal jurispru-
dence recognizes the dichotomy between public and private law. In the 
context of reprivatization claims, administrative courts became important 
players because they have exclusive jurisdiction to nullify nationalization 
decisions of the communist government, under Art. 156 § 1 pkt. 2 
K.p.a.,53F53 or to declare such decisions issued “contrary to the law,” under 
 
 52. The Bierut Decree nationalized approximately 30 percent of Warsaw’s area. The issue of 
judicial reprivatization in Warsaw also has a political dimension.  The current President of Warsaw, 
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, as a result of the recent investigation conducted by the Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau (CBA), is being accused of not exercising sufficient supervision over the repri-
vatization process within the City Hall. The report, which was disclosed in March 2017, empha-
sized that twelve properties out of fifty investigated were returned to the former owners without 
any legal basis. The President refused to sign the protocol and rejects accusations of a lack of suf-
ficient monitoring. As of March 24, 2017, the CBA notified Warsaw prosecutors about their suspi-
cions of criminal offenses being committed by City Hall officials: in particular, the failure to fulfill 
administrative duties for the purpose of obtaining a material benefit, as regulated in Art. 231 § 2 of 
the Polish Penal Code. This is a felony, punishable with imprisonment from one to ten years.  In 
December 2017, three public officials from the City Hall were arrested under bribery charges.  Also, 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz has been summoned several times by the Reprivatization Commission to testify 
as a witness. At the end of October 2017, due to her refusal to testify, the Commission fined her. 
The President of Warsaw claims that the Commission is unconstitutional, and thus, she has no legal 
duty to adhere to its subpoenas. See Komisja weryfikacyjna vs Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz. Jest 
kolejna grzywna dla prezydent Warszawy, RMF 24 (Oct. 18, 2017, 3:58 PM), 
http://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-komisja-weryfikacyjna-vs-hanna-gronkiewicz-waltz-jest-
kolejn,nId,2454146. See also Piotr Kaczorek, CBA składa nowe zawiadomienie o przestępstwach 
przy reprywatyzacji w Warszawie, CENTRALNE BIURO ANTYKORUPCYJNE (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://cba.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/3655,CBA-sklada-nowe-zawiadomienie-o-przestepstwach-przy-
reprywatyzacji-w-Warszawie.html. 
According to the official documents published by the Warsaw City Hall, former property owners, 
who had property nationalized under the Bierut Decree between 1947 and 1949, filed approxi-
mately 17,000 applications for the establishment of the right of temporary ownership. A majority 
of them were rejected or are still pending an administrative decision to be issued. Since 1990, ap-
proximately 7,000 applications were filed in the aftermath of nullification of the original national-
ization decisions by the administrative courts. As a result, the President of Warsaw issued approx-
imately 4,000 decisions of restitutio in integrum, excluding financial compensation decisions. See 
Tomasz Demiańczuk, Biała Księga reprywatyzacji warszawskich nieruchomości, MAISTO 
STOŁECZNE WARSZAWA (July 13, 2016), http://www.um.warszawa.pl/aktualnosci/bia-ksi-ga-
reprywatyzacji-warszawskich-nieruchomo-ci. Several major newspapers investigated the scope of 
irregularities in the process of reprivatization of Warsaw’s properties. See, e.g., Reprywatyzacja w 
Warszawie, GAZETA PRAWNA.PL, http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/tagi/reprywatyzacja-w-war-
szawie;dzika-reprywatyzacja. 
 53. Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego [K.p.a] [Code of Administrative Procedure] 
(Pol.). 
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Art. 158, if a nullification is not possible due to having produced “irre-
versible legal effects.”  
Considering that former property owners have no direct claims 
based on the Bierut Decree, the critical provisions of the administrative 
law became: Art. 156 § 1 pkt. 2, and Art. 158, which allow challenges to 
administrative decisions with regard to their property. From a legal per-
spective, these two provisions can be considered as a safety valve and a 
legal mechanism which enables individuals to challenge in perpetuity ad-
ministrative decisions which were issued in a flagrant violation of law. 
The administrative law in Poland introduces a rebuttable presumption of 
legality of administrative acts issued by administrative authorities, which 
means that despite the fact that a nationalization decision was illegal, i.e., 
issued in violation of substantive nationalization laws, it remains valid 
and legal until eradicated from the legal sphere by a judicial decision of 
an administrative court.  These administrative law provisions can be con-
sidered as a necessary legal construction within any democratic jurisdic-
tion; however, since any nullification decision of the court works ex tunc, 
judicial decisions of whether to annull any nationalization act must be 
properly balanced with several constitutional standards, which includes 
the following principles as expressed in Art. 2 and Art. 31 of the Consti-
tution: protection of acquired rights in good faith, legality, and trust.  
According to Roman Trzaskowski,54F54 who is the current judge of the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court is confronted with a heavy burden 
because the majority of nationalization acts were issued by the Com-
munist government in violation of laws which were enacted within this 
 
 54. See Roman Trzaskowski, Reprywatyzacja w Orzecznictwie Izby Cywilnej Sądu 
Najwyższego, in STUDIA I ANALIZY SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO TOM III 135 (Mateusz Pilich ed., 2016). 
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scope.55F55 In other words, from 1945 until 1958, the Communist govern-
ment enacted several statutes56F56 which were supposed to govern the pro-
cess of nationalization of major sectors of the Polish industry. The fact 
that former owners can challenge the validity of nationalization decisions 
comes from their erroneous enforcement and not from the fact that they 
did not envision any compensation. Thus, considering that a majority of 
nationalization decisions were unlawful, i.e., issued in violation of then-
binding laws, and the massive scale of the process of nationalization, 
every decision in this realm by the Supreme Court will be evaluated from 
a legal, moral, and social perspective. Until recently, the Polish govern-
ment, as a policymaker, did not address the problem of reprivatization. 
That is a major factor underlying why administrative courts became pri-
mary participants in the process of reprivatization in the country.   
Whether the perspective of the Constitutional Tribunal57F57 has a sub-
stantial impact on reprivatization decisions by administrative courts re-
mains a matter of debate.  First, in 2001, the Tribunal effectively fore-
closed any constitutional challenges by individual claimants to 
nationalization laws. It held that, despite the illegitimacy of the Com-
munist regime in Poland, the subsequent influence of this regime on the 
formation of Polish society was significant and constitutes the very basis 
 
 55. Very important feedback on this issue was provided by Warsaw based attorneys, Stefan 
Jacyno and Radosław Wiśniewski from Wardyński & Partners, who stated that on the basis of their 
experience in reprivatization litigation, the Communist government rarely adhered to any proce-
dural rules. For example, when taking over factories owned by private owners, the government 
didn’t prepare detailed protocols, as required by law, which would contain all the necessary infor-
mation regarding the factory, and whether a particular nationalization decision meets the criteria 
established by the substantive laws. It was often the case that the nationalization decision was not 
accompanied with any protocol, and the former owner was only granted a very ambiguous nation-
alization decision stating that the factory is taken over on the basis of relevant provisions. As of 
today, those former owners who decide to challenge nationalization decisions, often rely on their 
own, private documentation, such as for example photographs taken in order to document at the 
court that their factory didn’t meet the statutory criteria to be nationalized. International Academic 
Conference on the Confiscation of Property in Poland and Efforts at Restitution, held by Cardinal 
Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw (June 28-30, 2017). 
 56. See  note 3. See LUTEREK & INSTYTUT STUDIOW POLITYCZNYCH, supra note 2. 
 57. It is important to emphasize that the Tribunal has authority to eradicate any legislation 
which violates the Polish Constitution, and also to issue legal opinions which theoretically are not 
binding for the civil and administrative courts. However, many attorneys with whom I met in War-
saw while conducting research for this paper emphasized that it is not unusual or ineffective for 
lawyers to rely on the authority of the Tribunal while litigating reprivatization cases. In particular, 
its verdict issued in 2009, in which the Tribunal confirmed that Art. 215 of the statutory law on the 
management of properties (Ustawa o Gospodarce Nieruchmosciami [Act on Real Estate Manage-
ment] (1997 Dz. U. nr. 102 poz. 651) (Pol.) is constitutional only under the condition that it will be 
applicable to all properties nationalized under the Bierut Decree. However, this verdict does not 
constitute a binding precedent, as it is only an advisory opinion. Thus, some lower courts recognize 
it as binding while others do not. 
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of the economic and social existence of a major part of Polish society up 
to the present.  In other words, the passage of time cannot be ignored from 
the legal perspective, otherwise it will lead to social chaos and perhaps 
even civil war. In 2015, the same Tribunal issued a verdict according to 
which the problem of reprivatization in Poland will disappear slowly and 
no longer constitute a significant social and legal issue. It seems that the 
Tribunal considers the passage of time as a factor in the reprivatization 
context because over time there will be fewer and fewer claimants.  Both 
verdicts of the Tribunal indicate a strong assumption that time will erase 
the problem. 
 When it comes to the judicial determination regarding the nullifica-
tion of the nationalization decision, the essence of the court’s analysis is 
focused around the issue of whether a particular nationalization decision 
resulted in “irreversible legal effects,” as stated in Art. 156 § 1 pkt. 2 
K.p.a. If such legal effects occurred, according to Art. 160 K.p.a., the 
court cannot eradicate such a decision, but instead, can only determine 
that such an act was issued in gross violation of the law. This verdict 
provides the claimant with the opportunity to seek compensation for the 
lost property, but the compensation is limited only to damnum emergens.  
When the court nullifies the nationalization decision, a new admin-
istrative proceeding begins, pursuant to Art. 7 of the Bierut Decree. The 
aim of this proceeding is to determine whether the subject property meets 
the statutory conditions under which the claimant can be granted tempo-
rary ownership.58F58 The legal condition of temporary ownership, estab-
lished expressis verbis in the Bierut Decree, is that the individual usage 
of the property by the owner can be reconciled with the City of Warsaw’s 
Urban Developmental Plan.59F59 If this legal condition is possible to meet, 
 
 58. An important criterion, which must be taken into consideration when making a decision 
of whether the claimant of the property has any legal standing, is to determine that the original 
owner of the property was not compensated on the basis of an indemnization treaty as a foreign 
citizen. The nationalization of Warsaw’s properties affected not only Polish citizens, but also for-
eign citizens. Because of the high level of criticism coming from foreign jurisdictions, the Com-
munist government was politically pressured to compensate the damage caused to non-Polish citi-
zens. Thus, between 1946 and 1971, Poland signed ten bilateral indemnization treaties with 
European countries, as well as with the USA and Canada. See ALEKSANDER HETKO, DEKRET 
WARSZAWSKI. WYBRANE ASPEKTY SYSTEMOWE (2d ed. 2012). 
 59. See Bierut Decree, supra note 16, at ust. 1. The City of Warsaw is legally obliged to de-
velop in accordance with specific statutory laws known as the Urban Plan of Development for the 
City. This process is designed to be transparent and to provide Warsaw’s residents with a right to 
object to any of the City’s proposals. This Urban Plan of Development is supposed to guarantee 
that Warsaw’s architectural expansion proceeds on a long-term and coherent basis. Thus, if the 
property of the claimant is situated in a part of Warsaw which, according to the Plan, is dedicated 
to perform certain public utility functions (i.e. public schools, hospitals, playgrounds, cemeteries), 
the owner can obtain temporary ownership of his or her property if the public function can be 
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which means that the ownership of the property can remain with the legal 
owner while the property still can perform certain statutory public func-
tions, we have a classic case of restitution in integrum where the former 
owner recovers his property. On the contrary, if the condition as estab-
lished in Art. 7.2 of the Bierut Decree cannot be met, the former owner 
has a compensatory claim. As we see, the nullification of the original na-
tionalization decision seems to be the most beneficial to the claimant be-
cause it has the potential for a physical restitution of the property into the 
owner’s hands.  
As already mentioned, the concept of “irreversible legal effects” of 
a nationalization decision, as formulated in Art. 156 § 2 K.p.a., remains 
the key term within the entire reprivatization debate, as its interpretation 
conditions whether administrative courts are obliged to nullify the origi-
nal nationalization act. The core of the problem is that the judicial inter-
pretation of this term by the Supreme Court is not convergent with the 
opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC).  This situation is 
defined by the Polish doctrine as clear evidence that one can have differ-
ent understandings of the term “irreversible legal effects,” depending on 
the legal perspective and the social consequences one wants to achieve. 
The bottom line in this debate is that the SAC seems to be in opposition 
to the judicial interpretation of this concept by the Supreme Court, which 
supports an old civil law principle of public credibility of land and mort-
gage registers.   
According to the Supreme Court,60F60 when we have a situation in 
which the original owner was deprived of the ownership of the property 
through an illegal nationalization act, and the government, as the new 
owner of this property, made subsequent financial transactions regarding 
the property (i.e. sale, lease, granting temporary usufruct), third parties 
who were involved in these legal transactions are protected by the prin-
ciple of public credibility of public land registers. In other words, if a 
third party, relying in good faith on the public information available in 
the land registry that the government is the legal owner of a property, 
decided to purchase or lease such a property, this legal transaction cannot 
be reversed and qualifies as a case of irreversible legal effects. However, 
 
accomplished while the private ownership of the property remains in the hands of the legitimate 
owner. This legal issue will be examined in the subsequent part of this paper. Thus, it is sufficient 
to mention here only that under the Communist regime, the possibility for a private individual to 
perform public utility functions through the means of owning a property was very limited by the 
law; only private schools, hotels, and (to a limited degree) hospitals could do so. In addition to 
these legal restrictions, one has to consider that the Marxist ideology constituted a major underpin-
ning of the interpretation of then binding laws.   
 60. See Sąd Naczelny [Supreme Court], III AZP 4/92, May 28, 1992 (Pol.). 
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the case law of the SAC seems to be very ambiguous on the issue of irre-
versible legal effects.61F61 On the one hand, it sometimes recognizes that the 
principle of public credibility of land registers protects third parties who 
purchased a property in good faith, and thus it creates irreversible legal 
effects, but on the other hand, the SAC considers that the mere fact that a 
nullification of the nationalization decision will not result in restitution 
of a property in natura does not necessarily mean that such a nationaliza-
tion act caused irreversible legal effects. The line of reasoning is the fol-
lowing: the nationalization decision was issued in flagrant violation of 
law by administrative authorities, and, after it was re-examined by the 
administrative court, it became nullified. The rationale behind this nulli-
fication is that the original act did not result in irreversible effects, as a 
third party become the owner of such property not on the basis of the 
original nationalization act, but on the basis of subsequent governmental 
administrative decisions, which do not affect the issue of “irreversibility 
of legal effects.”  
Certainly, the lack of a bright line on how to maintain constitutional 
standards and social justice when making a judicial determination 
whether to nullify the nationalization act, combined with two other sig-
nificant provisions of the civil law,62F62  contributed to the emergence of the 
legal phenomenon of “Wild Reprivatization.”   
C. The phenomenon of “Wild Reprivatization” in Warsaw 
It appears that the term “Wild Reprivatization” emerged in public 
discourse not only because of the complex mechanisms of judicial repri-
vatization, which are beyond the comprehension of laymen, but also be-
cause the system became abused by fraudulent reprivatization cases.63F63 
These abuses were facilitated by two unique civil law constructions: the 
 
 61. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], OPK 4-7/98, Nov. 
9, 1998 (Pol.); Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], IV SA 2182/99 
(Pol.). 
 62. The first provision allows for public trade between parties of Bierut Decree claims. The 
second provision is linked to the civil law construction of a legal representation for a third party, 
who is subject to a civil proceeding and whose physical address cannot be identified. 
 63. According to the Ministry of Justice and Prosecutor General, the criminal investigation of 
approximately 100 properties which were reprivatized in Warsaw is ongoing. See MINISTERSTWO 
SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI, https://www.ms.gov.pl/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018). The non-governmental or-
ganization Miasto Jest Nasze provides on its website a model of reprivatization which links together 
in a criminal conspiracy some major political figures, organized crime groups, and attorneys. It also 
provides a report with a list of properties which, according to this organization, were reprivatized 
in a fraudulent manner. See Warszawska Mapa Reprywatyzacji, supra note 10. 
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possibility to trade in legal claims,64F64 and the institution of a legal repre-
sentative for a person whose place of residence is unknown, i.e. a cura-
tor.65F65  
With regard to the former, the principle according to which an indi-
vidual can trade his or her legal claim or right is well established in Polish 
jurisprudence. In the context of Warsaw reprivatization, the following 
factors have to be considered. On the basis of the Bierut Decree, former 
owners whose property was nationalized did not have a compensatory 
claim per se, but a claim to the establishment of temporary ownership of 
the property. Before such a claim can be re-examined today, first the 
claimant has to nullify the prior nationalization decision. As we see, the 
legal process is complex and uncertain, and thus on the one hand, when 
a claimant is approached by a third party with a proposition to purchase 
such an uncertain claim it may seem like a fair proposition.  On the other 
hand, there seems to be a certain element of vulnerability present for the 
claimant when being approached by a professional buyer of Bierut De-
cree claims, due to the buyer’s knowledge, expertise, and funds.  As long 
as parties engage in a fair deal, without “insider” knowledge, there is no 
legal problem, and no conflict of interest. The problem arises when a third 
party, based on his or her special knowledge,66F66 proposes a deal to the 
claimant, as has been alleged to have occurred in the prominent recent 
case of property which was located at the time of nationalization at 
Chmielna 70.67F67  
The second contributing factor to the abuses of the current model of 
reprivatization refers to the civil law institution which is established in 
order to secure personal and property rights of the person whose place of 
physical residence is unknown to the court, and who is a party to the civil 
 
 64. Legal claims based on the Bierut Decree can be traded, as with any other legal claims or 
rights, pursuant to Art. 912 of the Civil Code. Kodeks cywilny [Civil Code] Art. 912 (Pol.). How-
ever, the new statute enacted in September 2016, in order to remedy the abuse and fraudulent rep-
rivatization taking place in Warsaw, introduced several limitations within this realm. For example, 
once the City Hall of Warsaw announces publicly the address of the property with regard to which 
the original claim based on the Bierut Decree was filed by the owner, legal heirs to such property 
have six months from the official publication to provide the City Hall with their names and resi-
dential addresses, and subsequently within three months they must gather sufficient evidence of 
their ownership rights to the property. In the case no legal action is taken on behalf of the legal 
heirs of the property, their legal claims to such property expire and the property ownership is trans-
ferred to the government.   
 65. This institution is regulated in the Civil Code, Family Code, and also various other stat-
utes. 
 66. Similar to inside knowledge in the corporate context. 
 67. The case of reprivatization of Chmielna 70 was examined on the basis of publicly availa-
ble documents on the website. See Cʜᴍɪᴇʟɴᴀ 70, https://chmielna70warszawa.wordpress.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2018). 
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proceeding.  In Warsaw, many former owners of property died in World 
War II, but there are no official records which would confirm their death. 
A typical modus operandi of a third party who wants to take ownership 
of a particular property in Warsaw68F68 illegally is that the person will re-
quest the court to establish him or her as a legal guardian of the legal 
owner.69F69 Polish courts agreed to such requests, despite some of the legal 
owners being in their hundredth year of age, because there was no legal 
presumption of their death in the absence of official records confirming 
the death. For example, in the reprivatization case of a property located 
at Targowa Street, a well-known professional buyer of Bierut Decree 
claims was a co-owner of a property and requested the court to make him 
the legal representative of his co-owner, whose physical address was not 
known to him. He provided false testimony that he made several attempts 
to find her and was unsuccessful. The court agreed, and thus, he became 
the full owner of the property.70F70   
D. The new legislative statute on property reprivatization in Warsaw as 
a legal remedy to the legal and social disorder arising from the Bierut 
Decree  
In the aftermath of the recent public disclosure of reprivatization ir-
regularities in Warsaw by various democratic constituencies (e.g. private 
citizens, investigative journalists, and NGOs), the current government 
adopted three significant measures in order to address the problem.  
 
 68. The abuser knows that the original owner of the property is no longer alive, or his or her 
heirs are impossible to identify. See generally Ewa Andruszkiewicz, Reprywatyzacja w Warszawie: 
Kancelarie adwokackie miały poparcie elit politycznych i wymiaru sprawiedliwości, GAZETA 
PRAWNA (Mar. 3, 2016), http://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/972506,reprytwatyzacja-w-war-
szawie-dyktat-prawa-wlasnosci.html. 
 69. Any person can become the legal representative for a party whose place of residence is 
unknown, and for whom there is no record of death. A legal representative does not have to be a 
court-appointed attorney.  In the context of reprivatization, where many former property owners 
who died during the war may not have relatives residing in Poland, this construction of civil law 
may seem absurd due to its vulnerability for potential abuse.   
 70. Marek Marcinkowski was indicted on July 21, 2017, for attempting to pursue a fraudulent 
reprivatization. He was also summoned to testify as a witness by the Reprivatization Commission; 
however, his defense lawyer challenged the constitutionality of the Commission and asserted 
Marcinkowski’s right to remain silent. See Akt oskarżenia przeciwko Markowi M. w sprawie 
usiłowania doprowadzenia do bezprawnej “reprywatyzacji” nieruchomości położonej w War-




Lawyer: restitution commission acts against the Constitution, Wolters Kluwer (June 26, 2017), 
http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/adwokat-komisja-reprywatyzacyjna-dziala-wbrew-konstytucji. 
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The first measure was adopted by the District Attorney, Prokurator 
Krajowy, on  November 17, 2016, who issued Executive Order Nr. 98/16 
and established a special team of prosecutors to re-examine past reprivat-
ization cases.71F71 If the results of the verification of past prosecutorial de-
cisions demonstrate that prosecutors’ refusal to pursue criminal investi-
gations was unjustified,72F72 then the newly established team of prosecutors 
is obliged to undertake all necessary criminal and civil measures in order 
to “freeze” these reprivatization decisions.  
For example, on March 22, 2017,73F73 as a result of an investigation 
pursued by the special reprivatization team, prosecutors from the Warsaw 
Praga District issued a legal motion to the civil court demanding to inval-
idate the 2015 sale contract of the property located at Stalowa 25. This 
property involved two elderly women who sold their Bierut property 
claims to a third party for the amount of PLN 30,000.74F74 The legal argu-
ment raised by the prosecutors is that the purchase price established by 
the parties was symbolic and it did not reflect the real market value of the 
property. Thus, the contract violated the basic principles of fairness and 
social norms, as established in Art. 58 § 2 of the Civil Code.  
Another example of investigative work pursued by the reprivatiza-
tion team refers to the property located at Odolanska 7,75F75 whose nation-
alization on the basis of the Bierut Decree was nullified as a result of an 
 
 71. Prokurator Krajowy Zbigniew Ziobro established a special investigative team of prosecu-
tors whose main task is to re-examine former decisions of prosecutors refusing to investigate al-
leged cases of fraudulent reprivatization in the city. In other words, a highly specialized team of 
prosecutors was set up in order to go through the files of those reprivatization cases which the 
Warsaw district prosecutors had refused in the past to investigate. For the legal statute that author-
izes Prokurator Krajowy to issue such an executive order, see Ustawa z dnia 28 stycznia 2016 r. 
Prawo o Prokuraturze [Act of 28 January 2016. Law on the Prosecutor’s Office] (Dz. U. z 2016 r. 
poz. 177 ze zm.) (Pol.). 
 72. Prosecutors in Poland, as in the United States legal system, exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion. Thus, the special team of prosecutors was established in 2016 to determine not whether the 
former decisions of prosecutors were illegal, but rather if they were unjustified. According to press 
reports, 95% of prosecution cases related to reprivatization in Warsaw have ended in failure. In half 
of these proceedings, investigations were not even initiated, while 19 cases were dismissed, and 
one was suspended. Tomas Gzell, Prokuratura regionalna bada 40 spraw dotyczących repry-
watyzacji, (Sept. 9, 2016) http://www.rp.pl/Nieruchomosci/309139982-Prokuratura-regionalna-
bada-40-spraw-dotyczacych-reprywatyzacji.html#ap-1. 
 73. See Pozew Prokuratury Regionalnej w Warszawie do Sądu o uznanie za nieważne 
czynności prawnych i zabezpieczenie roszczenia w sprawie nieruchomości położonej przy ul. 
Stalowej 25 w Warszawie, nabytej za 30 000,00 zł, PROKURATURA REGIONALNA W WARZAWIE 
(Mar. 30, 2017), http://warszawa.pr.gov.pl/news/583. 3 
 74. This fraudulent reprivatization case was re-examined by the prosecutors under the follow-
ing number: Sygn. akt RP III Par 76.2017. Id. 
 75. See Sprzeciw Prokuratury; Regionalnej w Warszawie od decyzji z dnia 27 września 2013 
roku, Nr 359/GK/DW/2013, wydanej z up. Prezydenta M. St. Warszawy przez Zastępcę Dyrektora 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  3:06 PM 
456 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
administrative decision issued in 2013 by Warsaw’s City Hall officials. 
Prosecutors challenged the legality of this nullification decision, as the 
material gathered in the nullification process at the City Hall did not pro-
vide sufficient evidence that the claimant to this property in fact had it in 
their possession when making the original claim in 1949. In fact, the ev-
idence indicates that the nationalized property was in the possession of 
the Communist government, and that the relevant building was estab-
lished as the official headquarters for the Ministry of Public Safety.  
The analysis of the foregoing two cases clearly shows that the spec-
trum of reprivatization irregularities being detected is very broad.76F76 Such 
inappropriate behavior77F77 violates fundamental standards of fairness in le-
gal transactions and gross negligence on the side of administrative au-
thorities in the process of evaluating evidence in reprivatization proceed-
ings.   
The second measure adopted at the governmental level was the ap-
pointment of a Commission of Inquiry on March 9, 2017 to investigate 
the regularity and legality of the operations of the authorities and public 
and local government institutions in the reprivatization process con-
ducted across Poland in the period of 1989-2016.78F78  This is an investiga-
tive commission equipped with broad prosecutorial powers, established 
 
Biura Gospodarki Nieruchomościami, PROKURATURA REGIONALNA W WARZAWIE (May 31, 
2017), http://warszawa.pr.gov.pl/news/605. 
 76. It is important to emphasize that because of this paper’s page limit, only two cases of 
fraudulent reprivatization were examined. Moreover, as of October 2017, there are 150 ongoing 
criminal investigations, according to the Prosecutor General. See Redakcja, Minister Sprawiedli-
wości ostro o aferze reprywatyzacyjnej. Handlarze roszczeń powinni drżeć, NIEZALEŻNA (Sept. 10, 
2017), http://niezalezna.pl/205408-minister-sprawiedliwosci-ostro-o-aferze-reprywatyzacyjnej-
handlarze-roszczen-powinni-drzec. 
 77. It is important to acknowledge that at the time this paper was being written, there was an 
ongoing criminal investigation being pursued by various law enforcement authorities, including the 
special team of prosecutors, the Central Anti-Corruption Office, and the special Parliamentary In-
vestigative Commission on Reprivatization in Warsaw. Therefore, the author of this paper know-
ingly used the term “wrongdoings,” instead of any legal terms, such as fraud, bribery, abuse of 
power, or gross negligence in the enforcement of statutory obligations by City Hall representatives. 
See Sprzeciw Prokuratury Regionalnej w Warszawie od decyzji z dnia 27 września 2013, supra 
note 74; PROKURATURA KRAJOWA, http://pk.gov.pl/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); CENTRALNE 
BIURO ANYKORUPCYJNE, https://cba.gov.pl/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018); Wydział Komunikacji 
Społecznej i Promocji, Patryk Jaki przewodniczącym komisji weryfikacyjnej ds. reprywatyzacji w 
Warszawie, MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI MAY 11, 2017), http://ms.gov.pl/pl/infor-
macje/news,9336,patryk-jaki-przewodniczacym-komisji.html; Komisja weryfikacyjna informacje 
ogólne, MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWOSCI, http://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/komisja-weryfikacyjna/infor-
macje-ogolne/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 78. See Ustawa z dnia 9 marca 2017 r. o szczególnych zasadach usuwania skutków prawnych 
decyzji reprywatyzacyjnych dotyczących nieruchomości warszawskich, wydanych z naruszeniem 
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on the basis of a statutory act adopted by the Polish Parliament.  The 
Commission launched its investigative work in March 2017 and revised 
13 privatized property cases within the first five months in Warsaw.79F79 
Among the examined cases was a property located at Chmielna 70.80F80 As 
a result of the Commission’s investigation, it was determined that War-
saw City Hall officials grossly violated Art. 7 and Art. 77 § 1 of the Code 
of Administrative Proceedings. Therefore, the Commission decided to 
nullify the reprivatization decision and the ownership of the subject prop-
erty was returned to the Polish government.  The essence of the legal vi-
olations committed by City Hall officials was that they did not perform a 
diligent examination of the legal basis of the transaction between a third 
party and legal heirs to the property. It turned out that a third party was 
acting in good faith, but legal heirs to the property were in fact not legit-
imized to engage in any transaction referring to this property, because the 
original owner of the property had already been compensated in the past 
and thus any legal claims based on the Bierut Decree had expired. Despite 
the complexity of legal issues surrounding the subject property,81F81 the ev-
idence available clearly indicates that the City Hall officials committed a 
 
prawa [Act of 9 March 2017 on Special Rules for the Legal Consequences of Reprivatization De-
cisions regarding Warsaw Real Estate, Issued in Violation of the Law] (2017 Dz. U. nr. 1 poz. 718) 
(Pol.). 
 79. See Komisja weryfikacyjna informacje ogólne, supra note 76. 
 80. The file number for this property is Sygn. Akt R 8/17. Grzegorz Majewski provided an 
interview for Gazeta Prawna on August 31, 2016, in which he claimed that he acted in good faith 
when entering into the purchase transaction, and that he neither violated legal norms, nor ethical 
norms of his profession. See CHMIELNA 70, supra note 66. 
 81. The subject property at the former Chmielna 70 originally belonged to Danish citizen 
Martin Holger, who permanently resided in Warsaw, and whose property was nationalized under 
the Bierut Decree. Due to international pressure in the aftermath of nationalization, the Communist 
government signed several bilateral treaties, i.e., indemnization treaties, according to which foreign 
citizens who lost the ownership of their properties in Poland were to be financially compensated 
by the Polish government. Denmark was among these countries, and the Polish government trans-
ferred an adequate amount of compensation money into a Dutch governmental account. Thus, Hol-
ger was legally compensated and any legal claims under the Bierut Decree to the subject property 
expired ex lege. The essence of this case is that Holger’s heirs sold their alleged claims to this 
property based on the premise that Holger never obtained the compensation money. This is the 
crucial link which connects us to a third party, Grzegorz Majewski, who purchased the claims to 
this property from Holger’s heirs. The main figure in the City Hall who was responsible for granting 
the ownership of the property to Grzegorz Majewski was a former director of the department deal-
ing with reprivatization. According to his testimony, he did not engage in any illegal act, since prior 
to the final verdict his department requested all the necessary documentation from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in order to determine whether Holger was placed on the list of Dutch citizens com-
pensated by the government. The official response from the Ministry was that they are not in a 
possession of any such formal or informal list. The very fact that there has been no official list, and 
that the subject treaty between the Danish and Polish government was not ratified and published 
was, in the opinion of the department of the reprivatization director, sufficient evidence to deter-
mine that Holger was not compensated and thus, his heirs were eligible to sell their claims to the 
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flagrant violation of law by being grossly negligent in their examination 
of the case. The second issue that inevitably arises in this particular con-
text (i.e., the significant value of the property involved, and a prominent 
Warsaw attorney as the ultimate beneficiary) is whether we are dealing 
with flagrant gross negligence or corruption.  
Finally, the third type of measure enacted by the government, aim-
ing to curb fraudulent reprivatization, is a statutory act enacted in 2015, 
which came into force on September 17, 2016,82F82as a “Small Reprivatiza-
tion Statute.”  The legal analysis of this act allows us to conclude that the 
main purpose of this statute was to close any further opportunity to com-
mit fraud, bribery, and other forms of criminal behavior in the process of 
reprivatization. Thus, it is a post-crime, emergency type of legislation 
which aims to limit future offenses. As with any emergency type of stat-
ute, despite the fact that its general goal is justified, it comes with various 
unintended social consequences. Due to the statute’s flaws,83F83 it does not 
completely close the opportunity to abuse the reprivatization process in a 
criminal matter. Before taking a deeper insight into this new law, there 
remains one more important issue which must be emphasized with regard 
to the nature of the phenomenon of “Wild Reprivatization.” 
The recent political and public discourse is primarily focused on 
criticizing the triad of measures84F84 adopted by the current government, and 
pays little attention to the fact that white-collar crime85F85 has flourished 
 
property. The former director of the reprivatization department was subpoenaed by the Commission 
of Inquiry in June 2016. See Postępowania przed komisją: d. ul. Chmielna 70, supra note 78.   
 82. The full Polish title of this statute is: Ustawa z dnia 25 czerwca 2015 r. o zmianie ustawy 
o gospodarce nieruchomościami oraz ustawy – Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy, published in Dz.U. 
2016 poz. 1271, but it functions in the legal sphere as “Mala ustawa reprywatyzacyjna,” which 
translates into “Small Reprivatization Act.” See Ustawa z dnia 25 czerwca 2015 r. o zmianie ustawy 
o gospodarce nieruchomościami oraz ustawy - Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy [Act of June 25, 2015 
amending the act on real estate management and the Act - Family and Guardianship Code] (2016 
Dz. U. poz 1271) (Pol.). 
 83. Feedback provided by Maciej Kalinski, on November 10, 2016, during the interview in 
Warsaw. Maciej Kalinski is a professor of civil law at Warsaw University Faculty of Law. 
 84. The triad of measures includes: the special team of prosecutors re-evaluating past prose-
cutorial decisions not to launch a criminal investigation into allegedly fraudulent reprivatization 
cases, the Commission of Inquiry over Reprivatization Cases from 1989, and the Small Reprivati-
zation Bill. 
 85. Edwin Sutherland introduced the concept of “white-collar crime” in 1939 as “crime com-
mitted by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.” The 
essence of his definition of white-collar crime is that it does not have to violate criminal law per se 
in order to qualify as crime as long as there has been a violation of trust entrusted upon the perpe-
trator and social harm. Thus, Sutherland defines white-collar crime as a moral transgression inde-
pendent of the illegal nature of the act itself. See Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Criminality, AM. 
SOC. REV. 1 (1940). 
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behind the respectable facade of Warsaw City Hall over the past dec-
ade.86F86 Moreover, the ongoing criminal investigations and the reversal of 
twenty-three prior reprivatization87F87 decisions by the Commission of In-
quiry indicates a likelihood of the existence of a political-criminal 
nexus.88F88 The fact that political discourse is primarily preoccupied with 
shifting the responsibility for the lack of comprehensive reprivatization 
laws onto the incumbent government, and the lack of pressure put on the 
current president of Warsaw to resign and take political accountability for 
her lack of supervision over the City Hall officials, clearly demonstrate 
that the dynamics of “trivializing white-collar crime” have unfolded.89F89 
According to H. Pontell,90F90 white-collar crime “not only suffers from triv-
ialization, but also from a failure of recognition, from invisibility, from 
its status, as a non-issue.” There are many factors that contribute to this 
process; for example, legal weaknesses in proving fraud and/or conflict 
of interest, but also lack of direct victimization, as in society not being 
aware that it has been victimized by fraudulent reprivatization until pros-
ecutors launch investigations. Also, Moynihan’s concept of “Defining 
Deviancy Down”91F91 is quite helpful in understanding the process of trivi-
alization of white-collar crime at the societal level. According to Moyni-
han, in light of the increasing volume of crime, as a society we have be-
come so familiar with this criminogenic reality around us that we no 
 
 86. The President of Warsaw is legally obliged to supervise the reprivatization process at City 
Hall. 
 87. According to the data available at the website of the Commission, as of January 11, 2018. 
See Postepowania Przed Komisja, supra note 78. 
 88. Among the most active NGOs in Warsaw fighting against fraudulent reprivatization is 
Miasto Jest Nasze, which published on their website an interactive map called “Reprivatization 
Mafia in Warsaw.” This map provides the names and connections between various actors engaged 
in reprivatization. These persons include politicians, businessmen, lawyers, judges, and organized 
crime gang members. See Warszawka Mapa Reprywatyzacji, supra note 10. Moreover, Prosecutor 
General Zbigniew Ziobro, during his most recent public conference, stated “[t]he scale of irregu-
larities during the Warsaw reprivatization was gigantic, and that the people who engaged in this 
process were prominent politicians, lawyers, who guaranteed to each other due to their political and 
social power in the city, criminal immunity. This is the essence of mafia type association.” See 
Ziobro: Wartość wyłudzonych nieruchomości sięga miliarda złotych, TELEWIZJA POLSKA, 
https://www.tvp.info/34370081/ziobro-wartosc-wyludzonych-nieruchomosci-siega-miliarda-zlo-
tych (last updated Dec. 10, 2017). 
 89. Henry Pontell introduced the phrase “Trivialization of White-Collar-Crime” in order to 
illustrate how various societal and political factors, combined with the very nature of white-collar 
crime, lead to undermining and lack of recognition of this type of criminal offense by society and 
the criminal justice system. See Henry Pontell, Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy implications of 
Alternative Definitions of “White-Collar Crime”: Trivializing the Lunatic Crime Rate, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 39-56 (Shanna Van Slyke, Michael Benson & 
Francis Cullen eds., 2016). 
 90. Id. at 42. 
 91. Daniel Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 Aᴍ. Sᴄʜᴏʟᴀʀ 17 (1993). 
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longer react to it. We take it for granted. Also, we do not necessarily de-
note many of these crimes as deviant.92F92  Finally, British criminologist M. 
Levi describes this process in the following manner: “[t]he fraudster is 
not lodged in the public imagination as some familiar “folk demon.” Hoo-
ligans, drug traffickers, child batterers, and terrorists are well established 
in our tabloid gallery of rogues and misfits.”93F93 In the case of Warsaw’s 
fraudulent reprivatization, typical factors which shield white-collar crim-
inals from being labeled as offenders and deviants – high social status, 
respectability, running successful and legitimate businesses – are present 
and applicable.  
From a political perspective, there is nothing surprising about the 
fact that the opposition party criticizes the policy of the incumbent gov-
ernment.94F94 This practice constitutes a well-established democratic stand-
ard. When it comes to a legal statute, however, the pros and cons can vary 
depending on the political and economic views being taken. Interestingly, 
most academics, lawyers, and judges agree that the legal mechanism of 
the “Small Reprivatization Bill,” which aims to stop the problem of rep-
rivatization in Warsaw, is unfair and violates both the Polish Constitution 
and European Convention on Human Rights.95F95  
On the other hand, when taking a strictly criminological perspective, 
this statute seems to be the masterpiece on how to control fraudulent rep-
rivatization. The following reasoning provides the supporting arguments.   
The reprivatization process cannot be understood exclusively as a 
legal or judicial process, but rather, as a process deeply embedded in a 
larger political and social context. Various political and social variables 
provide us with a contextual framework for the analysis of reprivatiza-
tion-related crime. Many criminological theories (e.g. anomie/strain, 
 
 92. In Poland, since 2002, there had been several investigative commissions enacted at the 
Parliamentary level, which investigated a number of white-collar crime cases involving top-level 
politicians and businessmen, i.e. the Rywin scandal, the PKN Orlen scandal, the Agrarian-Land 
scandal, the Gambling sector scandal, and the ongoing Amber Gold scandal; see Największe afery 
biznesowo-polityczne w Polsce, Bᴀɴᴋɪᴇʀ.ᴘʟ (June 6, 2014) https://www.bankier.pl/wiado-
mosc/Najwieksze-afery-biznesowo-polityczne-w-Polsce-7216379.html. 
 93. See Michael Levi, Trans-National White-Collar Crime: Some Explorations of Victimiza-
tion Impact, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
GILBERT GEIS (Henry N. Pontell & David Shichor eds., 2001). 
 94. The current opposition party in Poland, Platforma Obywatelska, criticizes the enactment 
of the special team of prosecutors to review past reprivatization cases which were dismissed, and 
the Commission of Inquiry. 
 95. See Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitution of the Republic of Poland of Feb-
ruary 4, 1997] (1997 Dz. U. nr. 78 poz. 483) (Pol.); Council of Europe, Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 
4, 1950, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
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learning/differential association, control theory, routine activity theory) 
point to the role of contextual factors in crime causation, and all of them 
can be applied to the study of white-collar crime in the present reprivati-
zation context.  
Coleman’s theory of white-collar crime96F96 seems to be the most ad-
equate theory supporting the enactment of the “Small Reprivatization 
Bill.” He proposes the “routine activity” theory, according to which the 
convergence of three elements explains why crime is committed: the sup-
ply of motivated offenders, the availability of suitable targets , and an 
absence of capable guardians.97F97 In the Warsaw case, there had been a 
critical element of opportunity, in the form of vague reprivatization laws 
containing legal loopholes, and a lack of “gatekeepers” who would mon-
itor this entire process.  The process of “Wild Reprivatization” consisted, 
to a certain extent, of white-collar crime, but the central question remains 
as to the scope of illegality per se.98F98  
Therefore, if one agrees that the “routine activity” theory explains 
the root causes of Warsaw’s “Wild Reprivatization,” one has to admit that 
the only policy to be enacted is to eliminate the existing opportunity to 
commit crime. This is precisely what the government did. Now the ques-
tion is whether the cost of implementing such a policy will outweigh its 
desirable goals.99F99   
 
 96. See James Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93 AM. J. OF 
SOC. 406 (1987). 
 97. Criminology scholars agree that routine activity theory is applicable not only to predatory 
crimes, but also to organized crime, including organized crime in countries undergoing political, 
and economical transition. See ALEXANDER KUPATADZE, ORGANIZED CRIME, POLITICAL 
TRANSITIONS AND STATE FORMATION IN POST-SOVIET EUROASIA (Palgrave Macmillan ed., 1st 
ed. 2012). 
 98. The author of this paper would like to emphasize one more time that for the purpose of 
this publication, a broader criminological approach to the concept of crime was applied, following 
Sutherland’s framework. Thus, the very fact that there had not been any criminal law violations, 
but only violations of administrative and/or civil law, constitutes the essence of Sutherland’s theory.   
 99. Pursuant to the new reprivatization statute in Warsaw, on February 22 and March 29, 
2017, the City of Warsaw started issuing individual Notices or Announcements, in Polish and Eng-
lish, concerning properties for which legal heirs have six months to appear at the City Hall in order 
to claim their legal rights to these properties; afterwards, they have three months to prove their 
claim. The time starts running from the date of publication of the relevant notice. The legal mech-
anism introduced in this bill states that if legal heirs to the property do not provide sufficient evi-
dence to prove their ownership, their claims based on the Bierut Decree will expire and the subject 
property will ex lege become the property of the government. Various stakeholders provide their 
arguments that this reprivatization bill is not fair and transparent legislation. In other words, Poland 
is criticized that this statute does not address the problem of nationalization from the Bierut Decree, 
but rather, it closes any legal possibility to challenge nationalization acts after six months from the 
time the address of the property was disclosed. At the end of March 2017, 63 notices were issued. 
However, due to the fact that the City Hall updates the website monthly, in order to calculate the 
total number of notices issued, one would have to request City Hall for the official number. These 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
Normative systems do not operate within a vacuum, and with regard 
to Poland, it has to be emphasized that the year 1989 had a profound im-
pact on the social, political, and economic conditions. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the so-called “Eastern bloc,” Poland began a 
phase of reconstruction (legal, socio-political, economical) and opened a 
new chapter during which major legislative changes, which were neces-
sary in order to join the two political structures of the European Union 
and NATO, were initiated. The political and economic transformation of 
Poland, as well as many other post-Soviet countries, is often character-
ized by scholars in terms of following the fallacy that the introduction of 
a democratic system could be simply based on Western patterns. Accord-
ing to Melich,100F100 the attempt to construct a new democratic order without 
considering the specific features of a country, such as political and social 
history (previous democratic experience), and culture (individualistic or 
paternalistic culture, religious or secular approach), is at risk from the 
following pitfalls: the fragility of civil society, incoherence of democratic 
institutions, the revival of old communist habits and the return of post-
communist elites (former apparatchiks and their children), revisionist 
voices, and populist voices.  Perhaps the policy maker in Poland, by not 
enacting a comprehensive reprivatization statute, felt that similarly to 
other Western countries, it could afford not to regulate a certain socio-
economic issue. The truth is, in a country which went through a major 
political transformation, the process of reprivatization has to be governed, 
or at least supervised, when the policy maker refused or was unable to do 
so. Thus, the question is: who was supposed to become such a “gate-
keeper” in the case of Poland? The Supreme Court, the Constitutional 
Tribunal, society, or someone else?  
There is no doubt that Polish administrative courts became a critical 
chain in the administration of justice in the context of reprivatization. Un-
fortunately, this form of reprivatization has nothing in common with so-
cial justice and fairness because in the absence of a comprehensive stat-
ute, it constitutes a process of judicial correction of erroneous law 
enforcement by the Communist government. The question is whether this 
 
notices are also available in English at the Warsaw City Hall official website. See Ogloszenia i 
informacje-sprawy dekretowe, BIULETYN INFORMACJI PUBLICZNEJ, https://bip.war-
szawa.pl/Menu_podmiotowe/biura_urzedu/SD/ogloszenia/default.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
 100. See Jiri Melich, The Relationship between the Political and the Economic in the Trans-
formations in Eastern Europe: Continuity and Discontinuity and the Problem of Models, 34 EAST 
EUR. Q. 2 (2000). 
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is the optimal model of reprivatization which society desires and de-
serves.101F101 
From the perspective of individuals who became victimized by na-
tionalization decisions because they lost their property, this is a relevant 
question. It also remains a critical question for an average citizen, because 
the current model of reprivatization produces substantial economic costs 
and is questionable in terms of its legal foundations.  Several representa-
tives of the legal doctrine, including Ewa Łętowska102F102 and Tomasz 
Luterek,103F103 expressed a very critical opinion of the judicial work per-
formed by administrative judges, who are blamed for the poor and short-
term vision reflected in their reprivatization verdicts. According to 
Łętowska, administrative courts established a “model of decentralized 
and isolated reprivatization” in the country, by which she means that in-
dividual justices, when making particular nullification decisions, were 
not able to perceive that each decision, considering the scale and illegality 
of a majority of nationalization acts, contributes to a phenomenon of 
“massive reprivatization.”  Moreover, she points to a critical decision 
which was issued in 2008 by the Supreme Administrative Court,104F104 in 
which the court departed from an established principle according to 
which a former property owner cannot be restituted in natura if the prop-
erty is designated for public utility purposes (e.g. schools, playgrounds, 
cemetery, public road, park, etc).  Under the Bierut Decree, many owners 
whose property was nationalized filed legal claims to obtain temporary 
ownership of the property (perpetual usufruct). The only condition re-
quired to have the claims considered was that the usage of the property 
could have been reconciled with the function which the property was as-
signed in the City’s Plan of Development. This function often was de-
scribed in general terms as public utility.  The significance of this 2008 
verdict is that from the court’s perspective, the fact that a nationalized 
 
 101. Dr. Tomasz Luterek raises similar issues in his recent publication. According to Luterek, 
the recent scandal in Warsaw regarding reprivatization disclosed major factors which triggered a 
criminogenic environment to pursue fraudulent reprivatization claims. Thus, Polish society is 
forced to “wake up” and decide on the shape of reprivatization.  LUTEREK & INSTYTUT STUDIOW 
POLITYCZNYCH, supra note 2. 
 102. See 1997 Dz. U. nr. 102 Poz. 651. Łętowska emphasizes that the main goal of any nulli-
fication of nationalization decisions by administrative courts should be restitution of property in 
nature, and not a financial compensation. Mariusz Jałoszewski & Waldemar Paś, Prof. Ewa Łętow-
ska: Własność nie jest święta [CYKL “WYBORCZEJ”], WYBORCZA.PL (Feb. 14, 2015), http://wy-
borcza.pl/magazyn/1,124059,17405654,Prof__Ewa_Letowska__Wlasosc_nie_jest_swieta 
__CYKL.html?disableRedirects=true. 
 103. Id. at 317-28; Jałoszewski & Paś, supra note 104. 
 104. According to Łętowska , this verdict opened the gate to an excessive model of reprivati-
zation, within which former owners are disproportionately favored by the judicial system at the 
cost of the entire society. Id. 
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property performs a public utility function today does not prohibit the 
court from returning the property to the original owner. In other words, 
the court stated that a public utility function can easily be performed by 
a private owner. It is hard to agree with this line of reasoning because 
various public functions, such as providing affordable accommodation, 
public school education, etc., are statutorily prescribed to be performed 
by counties.  Counties are legally obliged to perform them regardless of 
whether they are profitable. Once a private owner takes responsibility to 
provide accommodation, his or her primary aim is to generate a profit, 
and this is exactly what can be currently witnessed in Warsaw. The court 
restitutes the property to its legal owner, despite the fact that the property 
is designated to perform a public utility function – such as affordable 
apartments for citizens – and the new owner decides immediately to in-
crease symbolic rental fees to a fair market-value.105F105  People who spent 
their entire lives there because they were renting in good-faith from the 
city of Warsaw, are forced to exit because they can no longer afford to 
stay. Do they deserve any legal protection or help in relocation, and if so, 
what kind?  It seems that the current process of judicial reprivatization in 
Warsaw is unable to balance these contradicting social interests.  
Another important conclusion that emerges in the context of repri-
vatization is that Polish administrative courts became the “gatekeepers” 
of fairness in the administration of justice in reprivatization cases. Ac-
cording to some representatives of the legal doctrine,106F106 for various rea-
sons, the courts failed to perform this function because they outweigh the 
interests of former owners against third parties, who, while acting in good 
faith, became legal owners, and tenants of previously nationalized prop-
erties.  
Unfortunately, recently disclosed “irregularities” in the process of 
reprivatization in Warsaw not only add to the already identified flaws in 
 
 105. The owners of restituted properties are labeled as “czyśiciele kamienic,” which translates 
to the “cleaners of tenement houses.” They often engage in criminal behavior, such as threats and 
cutting off electricity and water to force tenants who cannot afford to pay the new rent to exit the 
contract. This criminogenic phenomenon is well recognized by the Polish law enforcement and 
society. Various civil movements formed as a result of the emergence of this negative phenomenon. 
Among them was an activist, Jolanta Brzeska, whose body was found in the forest near Warsaw. 
As of 2017, the Warsaw prosecutors re-opened a criminal investigation into her murder case. See 
Dlaczego zginęła Jolanta Brzeska, SIECI PRAWDY - TYGODNIK MŁODEJ POLSKI (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.wsieciprawdy.pl/wsieci-dlaczego-zginela-jolanta-brzeska-pnews-2984.html; Renata 
Krupa-Dąbrowska, Czyściciele kamienic zapłacą zadośćuczynienie wyrzuconym z mieszkań, 
RZECZPOSPOLITA (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.rp.pl/Nieruchomosci/301199982-Czysciciele-ka-
mienic-zaplaca-zadoscuczynienie-wyrzuconym-z-mieszkan.html#ap-1; NASZEMIASTO, 
http://warszawa.naszemiasto.pl/tag/wlasciciele-kamienic-warszawa.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2018). 
 106. Professor Ewa Łętowska is among the harshest critic voices. 
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this paradigm, but also trigger fundamental questions; are these irregular-
ities minor exceptions to a sound exercise of justice in reprivatization 
matters, or rather, do they constitute the tip of an iceberg, which would 
indicate that there is something fundamentally wrong in the process of 
the administration of justice in Poland?107F107  
Another important question is whether administrative and civil 
courts can be regarded as taking a pro-reprivatization position because 
their judgements favour claimants. Certainly, such a critical approach to 
the justice system with regard to reprivatization must be balanced with 
more moderate opinions, as expressed by M. Kaliński and R.Trzaskow-
ski.108F108 According to both scholars, Polish courts were placed in the diffi-
cult position of having to decide on reprivatization claims because the 
policy maker failed to do so.  Unlike the legislator, who simply has an 
option of not passing certain laws, the justice system nolens volens be-
comes engaged in the process of public policy making. Thus, it is inevi-
table that courts’ verdicts on reprivatization will be criticized or ap-
plauded, depending on who the audience is. The aim of this paper was 
not to take sides in the foregoing debate, nor did it aim to provide satis-
factory answers to these questions. Rather, its goal was to emphasize that 
the current model of judicial reprivatization in Poland is a very complex 
legal issue and has flaws. To put it bluntly, the current model of judicial 
reprivatization refers to erroneous enforcement of nationalization laws by 
the Communist government. Thus, it favors those owners who were 
“lucky” because their properties were nationalized in violation of then 
binding laws. In contrast, there are those owners who were less “lucky” 
 
 107. See e.g., Tomasz Luterek’s perspective in the recent interview for Gazeta Prawna, in 
which he formulates a hypothesis according to which successful judicial reprivatization in Warsaw 
would not be possible if not for a tacit approval of attorneys and judges. Ewa Andruszkiewicz, 
Reprywatyzacja w Warszawie: Kancelarie adwokackie miały poparcie elit politycznych i wymiaru 
sprawiedliwości, Gazeta Prawna (Mar. 3, 2016), http://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly 
/972506,reprytwatyzacja-w-warszawie-dyktat-prawa-wlasnosci.html; How to solve the problem of 
reprivatization?, Polskie Radio (Jan. 02, 2017), http://www.polskieradio.pl/130/2791/Artykul/ 
1722854,Jak-rozwiazac-problem-reprywatyzacji.   
 108. Professor Maciej Kaliński, from the University of Warsaw, provided me with several crit-
ical points that are necessary to take into consideration before making any conclusions that admin-
istrative and civil courts are pro-reprivatization. For example, the legal principle of public credibil-
ity of land registers is applicable only when certain conditions are met. This principle will protect 
any third party that purchased a nationalized property from the government, and, generally speak-
ing, is recognized by the courts, despite the fact that from a legal perspective, one of its fundamental 
conditions is not met. Namely, the price of the property in the contract must be of a fair-market 
value and not be symbolic, which was the case in Warsaw, because the government offered many 
nationalized properties for sale with a 70% discount of the market price. In other words, if courts 
are pro-reprivatization, they should ignore the principle of public credibility of public land regis-
tries, as it does not apply to the majority of Warsaw properties, and former owners should be resti-
tuted in natura. 
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because their properties were nationalized in accordance with law. Only 
the former group can attempt to nullify the original nationalization acts.  
The fact that within the judicial system, one can identify different 
interpretations of relevant statutory provisions and then question how to 
balance constitutional principles, constitutes a major source of concern. 
However, the issue of consistency of judicial verdicts on reprivatization 
remains critical because individuals in the same legal position should be 
treated equally in a democratic system. What seems to be the case in Po-
land is that it is hard to predict whether the claimant will be successful 
with his or her claims, as it all depends on the judge’s interpretation of 
the law. 
The very fact that individuals who were victimized by nationaliza-
tion of their property, but whose legal status in terms of their eligibility 
to initiate judicial reprivatization varies significantly among individuals, 
creates tensions within society. Successful claimants are perceived to be 
unfairly privileged.  The entire concept of judicial reprivatization is vague 
and complex, and requires deep knowledge of various areas of law, in-
cluding administrative and civil law. It is beyond the comprehension of 
an average citizen. 
Finally, the legal phenomenon of judicial reprivatization created 
various myths109F109 around the process of privatization which can be devas-
tating to a young democracy, as they undermine the legitimacy and cred-
ibility of the justice system.  The myths contribute to a process of disin-
tegration of Polish society, as well as lack of trust in public institutions 
and in fellow citizens.  Nevertheless, in the light of ongoing criminal in-
vestigations, the fundamental question is: what is the scale of fraudulent 
reprivatization in Warsaw, and do the disclosed irregularities represent 
the “tip of the iceberg”? As we are seeing, Poland paid a high price for 
the lack of comprehensive reprivatization laws, and the new statute 
adopted in Warsaw has to be regarded as a strictly crime-control, emer-
gency regulation. The bottom line is that, in post-Soviet European coun-
tries like Poland, reprivatization cannot be understood as a legal and eco-
nomic process aiming to restore the status quo prior to nationalization. 
 
 109. Among them are the following: 1. Reprivatization claims are universal; 2. Most properties 
in Warsaw were restituted to third parties, and not the original owners or their heirs. According to 
the official report on reprivatization, published in 2016 by the City Hall, the above statements are 
not justified. With regard to the first myth, there have been approximately 40,000 properties na-
tionalized by the Bierut Decree, and approximately 17,000 claims based on this Decree were filed, 
which means that the problem of reprivatization refers to an estimated 30% of Warsaw’s national-
ized properties. With regard to myth number two, approximately 13 percent of reprivatization de-
cisions were issued to third parties, and not to the original owners or their heirs. 
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Reprivatization is an important element of a wider process of decommu-
nization,110F110 understood as a transition from the authoritarian regime to a 
full democracy and a liberal market. Decommunization also means that, 
to a certain extent, society will be compensated for the harm caused by 
the wrongdoing of the former government (i.e., by nationalization of pri-
vate property, by limiting personal rights and freedoms, by invigilation 
of society, by censorship of media and press, by political prosecutions, 
by murdering of political opponents, etc). Due to the complex nature and 
the scope of harm, Polish society needs to achieve a consensus that will 
provide a uniform sense of justice.  Unfortunately, the recent statute en-




 110. LUTEREK & INSTYTUT STUDIOW POLITYCZNYCH, supra note 2, at 324. 
